Written by Yaquelin Hinojosa-Fuentes, Rowen Hamilton, DaShaun Cannon Brown, Cole Frey

Edited by Rowen Hamilton

Background and Overview

Under the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has the power to observe fishing vessels to generate data for sustainability initiatives. Even though the MSA limits private funding of the observer programs in some fisheries, the MSA does not state who bears these costs in the Atlantic herring fishery. In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a herring fisherman argued against an NWFS rule that required them to pay for at-sea observers. Both the D.C. and First Circuits courts applied Chevron deference and upheld the agency's construction of the statute.

Decided in 1984, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council clarified how courts review ambiguous statutes through a two step process: asking whether Congress has had anything to say directly to precisely the question in issue, and if not, deferring to any reasonable agency construction. Under Chevron, the appellate courts found that the MSA was ambiguous concerning cost allocations for the herring fishery and ruled that the rule adopted by NMFS was within the band of permissible interpretations.

The Supreme Court's ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo radically transforms administrative law review by overturning Chevron. Replying to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the language of Article III in the Constitution, the Court upheld that judges—not agencies—have the ultimate authority to interpret the law. Loper found that Courts have to exercise independent judgment even if a statute is ambiguous. While courts may seek an agency's expertise, the courts are not obligated to defer to their interpretation. In the wake of this decision, the Court vacated and remanded lower court judgments. Agencies may still provide advanced persuasive readings of their statutes, but they will compete with other interpretive arguments.

Precedent

Overturning a decades old precedent, the Supreme Court cited plenty of decisions from the past, even referencing historical precedent such as the Federalist Papers. Here are some of the cases cited in this decision:

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) (1996), Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee (2016), Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (2014), and National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services (2005): established the principle of Chevron Deference.

Barnhart v. Walton (2002): an example of ambiguity within the application of Chevron Deference; concluded that an agency's interpretation does not violate Chevron if an interpretation does not "exceed the bounds of the permissible."

The Federalist No. 37. (Madison): indicates that the laws would always be subject to clarification, no matter how skillfully penned.

The Federalist No. 78. (Hamilton): indicates that the Framers intended for judges would be needed for the purpose of clarifying laws.

Stern v. Marshall (2011): affirms the principle that the judicial branch should be insulated from political pressures in order to ensure independent and impartial judgement.

Marbury v. Madison (1803): suggests that the judiciary has the responsibility to define the law when it is ambiguous.

Edwards' Lessee v. Darby (1827) and United States v. Vowell (1809): argued that the Executive Branch—by virtue of its expertise—has some say in the reasonable interpretation of the law.

United States v. Morton Salt Co. (1950): observed that the role of the Executive Branch expanded under the New Deal policies.

St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States (1936): observed that agency interpretations were taken as fact if they were consistent with evidence.

Gray v. Powell (1941) and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1944): demonstrates that the Court has ceded interpretive authority to the Executive Branch only when Congress specifically grants specific realms of authority to certain organizations in a limited capacity.

Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 156 (1944): decided against the Executive interpretation of a statute because it was not a settled standard nor did it properly outweigh the harms that such an interpretation would impose.

Michigan v. EPA (2015): grants administrative flexibility and the ability to regulate issues while enacting a statute.

Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States (2018): stated that the objective of written statutes is to have a single, fixed meaning rather than multiple plausible meanings.

United States v. Mead Corp. (2001) (quoting Christensen v. Harris County (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) and Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett (1990): cited as examples where Chevron's authority has been tailored or questioned in cases of implied powers of the Executive Branch.

King v. Burwell (2015) and West Virginia v. EPA (2022) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. (2001)): suggests that Chevron is not applied to questions of "deep economic and political significance," deferring to Congress to make such determinations.

Agostini v. Felton (1997): shows lower courts continue to follow Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled.

Payne v. Tennessee (1991): states that stare decisis is not an "inexorable command."

Knick v. Township of Scott (2019): stare decisis is legitimized by its soundness, workability, and reliance on former decisions.

Pereira v. Sessions (2018), Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. (2005), and Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp (1988): indicates that Chevron was vaguely understood by members of the Court and that such understandings were arbitrary and inconsistent with other interpretations.

CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries (2008) and Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund (2024) (quoting Dickerson v. United States (2000)): indicates that cases decided by a Chevron framework will not be invalidated because every previous decision will be subject to statutory stare decisis.

Effects of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

The Court's decision in Loper overturning Chevron has changed the decades-old precedent of executive authority regarding the establishment of federal agencies (Natural Resources Defense Council). The decision greatly expanded the judiciary's ability to interpret statutes adopted by federal administrative agencies. This expansion of power has given the courts latitude to scrutinize agency regulations, even pertaining to expertise and enactment.

In the majority opinion, the Court argued that Chevron gave agencies excessive legislative power, violating separation of powers. As a result, the Court's decision in Loper reinforced the separation of powers by restoring the legislative role to Congress and amplifying judicial oversight and interpretation of administrative law. (Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo 2024)

Terms and Definitions

Chevron Deference/Chevron. The overturned test that requires the judicial system gives deference to agency officials when interpreting sections of the law so long as: (a) Congress has not indicated any interpretation and (b) the agency's interpretation is not unreasonable.

Federalist Papers. A collection of New York pamphlets arguing for the ratification for the Constitution.

Stare decisis. Translated as "to stand by things decided" from Latin, it is the doctrine that courts will adhere to precedent in making their decisions.